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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the socio-economic implications of the US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement 
for the governance of Peruvian labour relations. It is argued that the trade agreement aims to lock-in 
the neoliberal market reforms carried out since the 1990s, which have given rise to an export-
oriented regime of accumulation that is characterised by considerable labour exploitation. The 
marginal role of organised labour and social movements to influence the course of events is placed 
against the backdrop of neoliberal hegemony and the altered state-society relations that followed 
from it. Most notably, it identifies the incapability of movement leaders to supersede the grassroots 
level and develop the necessary political linkages on the one hand, and deliberate government 
strategies that formed part of a powerful pro-free trade coalition of state officials and the corporate 
sector on the other hand. The article concludes that the ascendency of the neoliberal state has come 
to rely on increasingly coercive methods to curb more critical and anti-free trade elements in 
Peruvian organised labour and social movements. 
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Introduction 
On 1 February 2009, at the height of the global financial and economic crisis, the bilateral 
free trade agreement between the United States and Peru, also known by its official name Trade 
Promotion Agreement (TPA), came into force. The upsurge in export-oriented production in 
primary sectors, fuelled by the prolonged boom in global commodity prices, mobilised an 
extraordinary thrust in favour of the TPA within the Peruvian political economy, aptly encapsulated 
by president Toledo’s infamous public statement to conclude the agreement ‘sí o sí’, if necessary, at 
any cost (Perú21, 2005). At the same time, the booming export sectors of Peru’s political economy 
have attracted vast volumes of foreign and domestic investments, leading to newfound processes of 
commodification and dispossession. This has been accompanied by recurring exploitation of labour 
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and environmental destructions, which exacerbate the further impoverishment of urban and rural 
workers. Labour in the export-oriented production sectors has been characterised by low wages, 
considerable job insecurity, overtime and low levels of unionisation. Following a decade of neoliberal 
restructuring, the TPA, hence, constitutes a crucial vehicle in the new Peruvian regime of 
accumulation to ‘lock-in’ the neoliberal market reforms conducive to profitable capital accumulation 
and surplus extraction. 
The particular trajectory of trade negotiations with the US has caused a series of integration 
problems in the Andean countries. Though originally intended as an extension of pre-existing trade 
preferences granted by the US government to Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia under the 
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act of 2002, Bolivia and Ecuador remained 
reluctant to go along with the aggressive agenda for trade and investment liberalisation promoted by 
the US, Colombia and Peru, however, declared themselves eager to continue negotiations on a 
bilateral basis. While the ratification of the US-Colombia TPA by the US Congress impeded until 
October 2011, Peru remained the only Andean country that concluded, ratified and implemented 
the TPA within relative short notice. These ruptures exposed the distinctive and competing 
development models existing within the Andean region (Latimer, 2012: 80; Higginbottom, 2013: 
185). Whereas the governments of Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador have been pursuing alternative 
development models with input and pressures from organised labour and social movements, the 
governments of Peru and Colombia remained oriented towards free-market policies and continued 
integration into global circuits of capital accumulation.  
The article aims to examine the labour dimension of the TPA by embedding it into the 
wider transformation of Peru’s political economy, which originates in the economic crisis at the end 
of the 1980s. This transformation has involved a fundamental restructuring of state-society relations 
marked by the resurgence of the ideology and practice of free market economics, culminating in a 
neoliberal state project. In the context of a range of neoliberal market reforms, subsequent Peruvian 
governments have increasingly enacted policies of privatisation, liberalisation and free trade, while, 
simultaneously, fundamental labour rights have been increasingly curtailed. By focusing on the 
structural weaknesses of organised labour and other subordinated groups as well as prevailing 
fractions of Peru’s national capitalist class, the article explains how dominant discourses and 
interests, reflecting an underlying balance of power among social forces and the institutional setting, 
have influenced the course of events in Peru’s trajectory towards the conclusion and implementation 
of the TPA.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section offers a theoretical perspective for analysing 
state power and processes of internationalisation of the state. The second and third sections spell out 
the socio-economic content of the TPA’s labour chapter and the broader implications for labour. It 
is assessed how organised labour and social movements have been incapable to influence the course 
of events, while an emergent pro-TPA coalition spread among Peru’s capitalist class and state 
institutions has been successful in curbing anti-TPA sentiments within Peruvian society. The fourth 
section explains the structural weakness of trade unions and social movements by examining the 
broader transformation of Peruvian state-society relations, culminating into the neoliberal state 
project. The fifth section addresses how this transformation has shaped Peru’s political economy into 
an export-oriented regime of accumulation, which is increasingly characterised by high levels of 
labour exploitation. As the political process through which these market reforms have been 
materialised has an increasingly disciplinary character, the last section concludes that the neoliberal 
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state project has come to rely more and more on coercive methods in which political dissent has 
become more isolated and criminalised while foreign investors and trading companies continue to 
generate high profits. 
 
 
Labour and the Internationalised State 
Labour movements, globally, have been confronted with major challenges in the wake of 
increasing transnationalisation of production and finance and the concomitant neoliberal 
restructuring. Flexibilisation, declining unionisation and outright repression of workers in the Global 
South have been the bitter by-product of the global efforts to open up new markets for exports and 
investments that enhance the competitiveness of transnationally operating capitalists through 
enforcing neoliberal instruments of development (cf. Bieler, 2013). The declining capacity of trade 
unions in developing countries to improve their bargaining position has to be understood against the 
backdrop of the global transformation of social power relations as well as processes of 
internationalisation of the state. In particular, the financial and economic crisis has revealed the 
structural vulnerability of labour vis-à-vis transnational capital, which has been further exacerbated 
by deliberate state strategies. This section draws on critical IPE perspectives and provides a 
theoretical outline of the complex interplay of international conditions, institutional developments 
and social forces that results in the emergence of historically specific social structures of 
accumulation in the Peruvian context.  
 In contrast to state-centric approaches that reify states as unitary actors, the state and state 
power are perceived here as part of a broader ensemble of social relations (Gramsci, 1971). Social 
forces are shaped, but not determined, by the contradictions and exploitative character of global 
capitalism and find their bases in the social relations of production (Cox, 1981). An antagonistic 
relationship between capital and labour emerges out of the structural inequalities in the production 
process, although engendered by social, political, economic and cultural factors so that different 
fractions and strata emerge within these classes (Joseph, 2006: 53; Van Apeldoorn, 2002). The 
fundamental unequal social relations of production are obfuscated by the seemingly voluntary 
character of market relations of exchange, which mediates the appropriation of surplus through the 
process of capital circulation (Wood, 2005: 10-11). However, the formation of historically specific 
social structures should not only be understood as a mere product of structural social inequalities, 
but also as the result of the strategic action of key societal actors (Van Apeldoorn, 2002). As put by 
Horn, ‘it is through concrete, and historically specific agency expressed in the construction, 
articulation and contestation of hegemony in a Gramscian sense that social struggle and processes 
become manifest’ (2012: 580). Indeed, Gramsci depicts power not only as an underpinning of 
coercion, but emphasises also the importance of consent to reach hegemony. This consensual feature 
of power influences the prevalence of hegemony, albeit, coercion is always latently present (Cox, 
1983: 164).  
Capitalists continue to depend on the coercive functions of the state to secure the social 
order of private property relations and to maintain the favourable conditions for capital 
accumulation by providing a legal and institutional framework that guarantees stability and 
predictability in its social arrangements (Wood, 2005: 10-14; Harvey, 2005). The state is therefore 
not a subject nor a neutral terrain, but a social relation in itself (Jessop, 1990; Poulantzas, 1978). As it 
represents a site for social struggles, the state does not form a unitary block because its different 
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institutions might hold a contentious relationship. Despite such differences between state 
institutions and societal groups like business associations and trade unions, a certain coherence can 
emerge and be institutionalised over time. This coherence is based on the operational autonomy of 
the state with regard to pressures emanating from societal groups (Jessop, 1990: 260-262; Jessop, 
2008: 37; Brand et al., 2010: 158). This gives the state a ‘strategic-relational’ character because state 
power ‘reflects the prevailing balance of forces as this is institutionally mediated through the state 
apparatuses with its structurally inscribed strategic selectivity’ (Jessop, 2002: 40). It is the certain 
degree of independence that the state enjoys which enables this strategic selectivity, understood as 
the ability of state managers to pursue particular interests and strategies. This can explain why 
political outcomes sometimes contradict the needs of dominant societal groups, suggesting the 
continuous importance of the role of class agency in order to secure capitalist hegemony (Van 
Apeldoorn, 2004: 155).  
The transnationalisation of production and finance over the past three decades has given rise 
to structural transformations that engender transnational social forces and a process of transnational 
class agency. Transnational fractions of capital have increasingly transcended the borders of the 
nation-state (Van der Pijl, 1998). An emergent transnational capitalist class is bound together with 
state managers and intellectuals through common identities and interests by material and ideational 
structures (Egan, 2001: 77). This implies fundamental restructuring of the national state to advance 
the agenda of global capitalism, a process referred to as the internationalisation of the state (Cox, 
1987). It is thereby important to account for the uneven and distinctive national trajectories of 
capitalism, however, conditioned by ‘the international’ (Morton, 2007: 170; Bruff, 2010: 616). The 
state must be understood as embedded in a network of regulations across different spatial levels, 
underscoring the uneven character of global capitalism, resulting in a complex spatio-institutional 
configuration (Wissen and Brand, 2011: 2). The emphasis on the uneven development of capitalism 
is useful and necessary to account for the different spatial scales of global capitalism articulated 
through historically contingent state structures. Processes of state internationalisation tend to unfold 
differently across the world, highlighting the hierarchical relationship between different national 
modes of development in the capitalist world system. This is a fundamental prerequisite for global 
capital accumulation and generates relations of dependency among different spatial levels that form 
part of the world market. With this structural setting, the concrete positioning of each nation in the 
world market remains informed by the strategic orientation of domestic capitalist classes (Heigl, 
2011: 133; Aglietta, 1982; Lipietz, 1984).  
Capitalist expansion has led to a situation of unequal exchange between countries integrated 
into the global economy and policies of free trade tend to intensify these imbalances in trade and 
production. Consequently, workers around the world are not in the same economic position. 
Unequal exchange forms thereby the key mechanism of exploitation (Bieler, 2013: 178-180). Free 
trade agreements constitute therefore mechanisms to lock developing countries into a relationship of 
unequal exchange and institutionalise guarantees for sustained external transfer of surplus value 
(Higginbottom, 2013). Free trade agreements are, thus, highly contested projects. The coercive 
dimension of hegemony is not only manifest in the structural power of capital vis-à-vis subordinate 
groups, but also in what Gill has identified as ‘new constitutionalism’ (Gill, 2008), which refers to 
the politico-juridical lock-in of commitments to disciplinary neoliberalism. As will be argued below, 
the coercive dimension has become more pronounced and led to an authoritarian-like neoliberalism 
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in Peru, which is key to understanding the relationship between organised labour and Peruvian state 
formation.  
 
 
The Trade Promotion Agreement’s Chapter on Labour and Social Resistance 
From the outset, the trade negotiations, starting on 18 May 2004, centred on traditional 
trade issues such as market access for agriculture products, textile, sanitary measures, and highly 
contested issues that were not advanced yet at the WTO, such as investment, services and 
intellectual property rights. With regard to labour, the negotiations were more or less predetermined 
by the US. Its fast-track negotiating mandate under the Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 
stipulated the objective to incorporate fundamental labour rights into future trade negotiations that 
were already present in its Generalised System of Preferences programmes (USTR, 2013: 21-22). 
These fundamental rights included: (a) the right of association; (b) the right to organise and bargain 
collectively; (c) the prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labour; (d) a 
minimum wage for the employment of children, and a prohibition of the worst forms of child 
labour; and (e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work and 
occupation safety and health. These fundamental standards reflect the core principles of the 1998 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, with the notable exclusion of the 
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. Peruvian negotiators have 
confirmed that although the issue of non-discrimination was left untouched in order not to affect 
the fast-track status of the agreement’s ratification by the US Congress, the US government 
remained reluctant to include the non-discrimination provision on the grounds that it could elevate 
labour rights for migrant workers in the US.1 
The provisions of the agreement’s labour chapter centred instead on effective enforcement of 
the domestic labour laws, which in Peru are far from optimal. The exclusion of the non-
discrimination provision contradicts with Article 17.1(1) of the original TPA text (reprinted in 
PLADES, 2007), as both parties reaffirm their obligations as members of the ILO and their 
commitment towards the fundamental rights under the 1998 ILO Declaration. Instead of providing 
a minimum content guaranteed by both parties, the list of fundamental labour rights did not 
constitute adequate incentives to elevate labour laws. In the case of wages, the texts were designed to 
maintain and diffuse the minimum wage whether or not this was sufficient for the survival of the 
worker (Mendoza Nava, 2009: 154). Furthermore, both parties ‘shall not fail to effectively enforce 
its labour laws through a sustained or recurred course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting 
trade between the Parties, after the date of entry into force of this Agreement’ (Art. 17.2(1a), original 
TPA text). This is the only labour provision that is formally enforceable under the dispute resolution 
mechanism, in sharp contrast to all provisions pertaining to commercial interests that are enforceable 
through the formal and separate dispute resolution mechanism. The TPA includes provisions on 
openness and transparency in labour dispute resolution and forces governments to accept and 
investigate social complaints on corporate violations of labour laws according to domestic procedures 
(Art. 17.3(2;3); Art. 17.4; Art. 17.6(1;7)). The latter implies that despite the obligation to hear social 
complaints, these would not necessarily lead to government action (PLADES, 2007: 23-28). 
Moreover, the dispute resolution mechanism on labour issues is only applicable to productive sectors 
that participate in bilateral trade with the US. In other words, companies whose participation in 
bilateral trade with the US is non-existent, uncertain or non-demonstrable can very well escape the 
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labour monitors and sanctions (Mendoza Nava, 2009: 155). Hence, the adequate enforcement of the 
labour clauses came to rely on the institutional capacity of the Peruvian state.  
The weak content of the labour chapter, together with other major concerns in the field of 
agriculture, intellectual property rights and human rights, has provoked fierce criticism among 
Peruvian social organisations. In the context of trade liberalisation, many agrarian, indigenous and 
extractive industry movements have created a huge movement within the rural areas and have sought 
alliances with the urban labour movements. This culminated into the national campaign TLC ¡Así 
No! (FTA not like this!) under the leadership of the National Convention of Peruvian Agriculture 
(CONVEAGRO) with international support from Oxfam. The campaign had its direct antecedent 
in a larger platform that criticised Peru’s participation in the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA) between 1998 and 2003. Peru’s main trade unions the Peruvian Labour Confederation 
(CGTP) and Unitary Workers Confederation (CUT) as well as traditional peasant organisations 
such as the National Agricultural Confederation (CNA) and Peasant Confederation of Peru (CCP) 
have been part of a coalition that completely opposed the FTAA (Burneo de la Rocha, 2009). These 
urban and highland organisations, led by anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist sentiments, were more 
militantly opposed to any sort of trade agreement at all.  
Rather than being a homogeneous organisation, within the structures of the campaign, there 
were strong internal struggles between its different members. Both CNA and CCP formed part of 
the larger CONVEAGRO that emerged out of new forms of non-traditional agriculture along the 
coast as well as new sorts of small-to-medium-scale producers oriented toward market and product 
specialisation. While these were more concerned with compensation mechanisms for the expected 
damages, highland organisations worried more about the wider ramifications of the TPA for control 
of territory, access to resources, and food security (Bebbington, 2010: 17). Also Peru’s trade unions 
held different views on the TPA. Unions closely related to Peru’s labour party American Popular 
Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) accompanied the government and business elites in supporting the 
agreement (La República, 2007). On the other hand, Peru’s main trade unions CGTP and CUT 
were ideologically opposed to the TPA and lifted their criticism to neoliberal restructuring in 
general. Evidently, the division among these different social forces limited the presence of a united 
national campaign for another type of TPA, whose leadership was eventually reduced to a small 
number of individuals.  
Moreover, the government put little effort to include social organisation representatives in 
the trade negotiations and the official consultation remained rather poor. Government officials 
declared that consultations with trade unions and other social movements were less helpful than 
those undertaken with business as their criticism was not directly related to the TPA and, thus, little 
useful in the formulation of negotiating positions.2 Close personal ties between high state officials 
and business representatives, on the other hand, greatly enhanced coherence between the public and 
the private sector, strengthening the formation of a powerful pro-TPA coalition. The rhetoric of the 
political elite that the TPA would favour all Peruvians seemed appealing, and critical groups lacked 
political room and economic resources for a strong countermovement. Hence, trade unions and 
social movements remained incapable of influencing official TPA proposals and the major concerns 
remained at the grassroots level, which became manifest in massive mobilisations and strikes. The 
embracement of the TPA by Peru’s labour party APRA in the final vote on 28 June 2006 meant a 
decisive defeat for organised labour. The cooptation of APRA by the powerful hegemonic forces has 
marked its relationship with the rank and file grassroots movements by a major gap.  
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Labour as Determinant for the Trade Promotion Agreement 
After approval in Peru, the trade agreement came to depend on the ratification by the US 
Congress. Influential voices in the US had criticised the hasty nature of the negotiations and raised 
serious doubts about the commitment of the Peruvian government to the labour standards 
incorporated into the TPA (PLADES, 2007). With a Democratic majority in the US Congress after 
the mid-term elections in November 2007, a new consensus with United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) resulted in a ‘New Trade Deal’ that allowed for certain flexibilities in 
intellectual property rights, and elevated labour, environmental and investment standards in the 
pending trade agreements with Peru, Colombia, Panama and Korea (USTR, 2007). Although 
fiercely rejected by Peru’s state technocrats and industrial leaders, the proposed amendments had to 
be accepted in order to secure the TPA’s ratification by the US Congress.3 However, the US 
Congress was not authorised to amend the TPA since it had delegated temporal powers to USTR 
under the Trade Promotion Authority Act in 2002. Eventually, the decision of the Peruvian 
government to negotiate directly with the US Congress marked an important step towards the TPA’s 
ratification in the US, whereas the other remaining Andean partner, Colombia, continued to 
negotiate with USTR, resulting in a stalemate precisely because of labour and human rights concerns 
by the US Congress. 
The amendments on labour issues incorporated certain important repercussions. Article 17.2 
on the fundamental labour rights explicitly mentions the obligation to adopt, maintain and enforce 
in national statutes and regulations the fundamental rights of the 1998 ILO Declaration. The 
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation has been included. The new 
text also eliminates the reservation by means of which the right of parties to adopt or modify labour 
laws and standards is reaffirmed, seeking to ensure that these are consistent with the mentioned 
fundamental labour rights. With regard to the enforcement of labour laws (Art. 17.3), it was 
previously mentioned that the parties should not fail to effectively enforce its labour laws in a 
manner affecting trade. This obligation has been widened to including the laws on mentioned 
fundamental labour rights in a manner affecting trade or investment. Moreover, the scope of dispute 
resolution has been broadened from the narrow non-application of domestic labour laws to any issue 
of the chapter, including breaches of the fundamental labour rights (PLADES, 2007: 32). The 
Peruvian government under the leadership of president and APRA leader Alan García eagerly 
adopted the protocol of amendments and the concomitant promises to change laws with regard to 
precarious employment in Peru relieved the last remaining US doubts,4 greatly facilitating the TPA’s 
ratification in US Congress on 4 December 2007.  
Although embracing the amendments to the trade agreement, Peruvian trade unions 
remained sceptical about the true intentions and commitments to labour issues by president García 
and his government. In particular, the CGTP and the CUT have demanded the approval of new 
labour legislation in line with the ILO conventions, including the adoption of a General Labour Law 
that would integrate Peru’s scattered labour laws and decrees into one code, which has been 
constantly resisted by consecutive governments and national business.5 6 High doubts about the 
institutional capacity of the Peruvian state to implement the amended labour standards remained 
and trade unions demanded greater budget allocation to the Ministry of Labour and Employment 
Promotion. Frequent fines and financial punishments for incompliance with the labour standards 
under the TPA’s dispute resolution mechanism are expected to affect Peru’s state budget; in 
addition, non-payment of such fines can lead to temporary suspension of trade benefits (Fairlie and 
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Quejía, 2007: 134). Other groups feared that the maquila development in Peru would threaten 
people as cheap labour without ensuring decent work conditions. Increased competition from US 
multinationals is expected to outcompete Peruvian companies, forcing many workers into the 
informal sector without labour protection.7 The displacement of rural workers and producers is 
likely to increase rates of drug trafficking, violence and terrorism. On the other hand, although 
accepting the imposition of the amendments as a bitter drink to secure the TPA, Peruvian business 
groups have continued to demand for greater labour flexibility to remain internationally competitive. 
The structural weakness of trade unions and social movements to influence the course of events and 
the responsiveness of the Peruvian state towards private interests have be to understood against the 
backdrop of the broader transformation of Peru’s political economy and the state. 
 
 
The Transformation of Peruvian State-Society Relations 
Unlike many of its Latin American counterparts, Peru's economy, centring on an export-
oriented economic model, remained relatively market-friendly and non-interventionist well into the 
1960s. Long periods of oligarchic rule, authoritarianism and external influences generally had failed 
to redistribute economic growth and reinforced social inequalities in Peruvian society (Cameron, 
2011: 378). The military coup of 1968 put an abrupt end to the primary export based economy. 
The regime of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) introduced ambitious reformist and 
state-led development policies that sought to promote land reform, industrial communities, rapid 
unionisation and generous wage settlements (Solfrini, 2001: 109). Peruvian labour movements 
generally welcomed the efforts of the military regime to organise labour, promote employment 
security and reinforce legal rights of unions (Roberts, 1998: 210). Organised labour has traditionally 
been affiliated with the populist APRA party. The Peruvian Labour Congress (CTP), created by 
APRA in 1944 has been Peru's largest labour confederation until the 1960s, after which APRA 
started to rely on coalitions with conservative blocks (Levitsky and Mainwaring, 2006: 28; Solfrini, 
2001: 110). The strategic shift of APRA spurred many unions to abandon the CTP and by the early 
1970s, the Peruvian Labour Confederation (CGTP) had become Peru’s main labour confederation 
with a leadership dominated by the Peruvian Communist Party (Levitsky and Mainwaring, 2006: 
29).  
Simultaneously, ambitious agrarian reforms led to the expropriations of coastal plantations 
and highland haciendas, which were transformed into agricultural cooperatives managed by their 
former workers. However, these reforms benefitted only a small portion of the peasantry. The vast 
majority of temporary agricultural workers and indigenous groups remained outside the scope of the 
reforms (Roberts, 1998: 210-212). When the military regime started to implement austerity 
measures prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in response to the deteriorating 
economic prospects, strong popular opposition contributed to the unification of various social 
organisations in organising massive general strikes in 1977-1978 (Solfrini, 2001: 111; Roberts, 1998: 
211-13). Although the CGTP supported the military regime even after its shift to the right in 1975, 
it joined the more radical unions in the anti-government marches, which eventually played an 
important role in pushing Peru's transition towards democracy (Levitsky and Mainwaring, 2006: 35-
36). 
The economic reforms of the military regime were reversed with the presidency of Fernando 
Belaúnde Terry (1980-1985), whose liberal orientation gave primacy to improving the national 
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manufacturing sector by reducing production costs in order to become internationally competitive 
(Solfrini, 2001: 113). Tariffs were drastically reduced, state subsidies were lowered and the Peruvian 
economy became gradually opened up for foreign capital, however, without success: industrial 
production declined to 17.2% in 1983; unemployment reached 68% in 1984 and between 1979 
and 1984 wages lost 30% of their purchasing power (ibid.: 113). These first neoliberal market 
reforms were pragmatic and instrumental rather than ideological, and far from hegemonic (Arce, 
2005: 33). Heavily subsidised national industrialists strongly opposed the liberalisation of the 
Peruvian market, after which the government decided to withdraw the trade liberalisation efforts. 
Leftist organisations and unions also rejected the orientation towards the external market, but had 
been seriously weakened after confrontation with the military regime (Solfrini, 2001: 113). 
Moreover, radical Maoists from the Shining Path emerged out of the failure of land reform in the 
poorest highland departments and launched a vicious campaign of insurgency throughout the 
country (Cameron, 2011: 378).  
With the presidency of APRA leader Alan García Pérez (1985-1990), the market reforms 
were further reversed. His heterodox economic project was initially based on the organisation of a 
large solidarity pact among popular masses, national entrepreneurs and state institutions (Solfrini, 
2001: 116). Economic policies of wage increments, price controls and tax breaks to stimulate 
aggregate demand booked some success and generated a brief economic boom in 1986-1987 
(Roberts, 1998: 236). To reinforce state intervention, García unilaterally reduced the external debt 
payment to 10% of the value of exports, after which Peru became ineligible for further credit, 
thereby isolating Peru from the international financial community (Solfrini, 2001: 117). Foreign 
exchange constraints and increased government deficits led to renewed inflationary pressures by 
1987, mounting up to a record of 7,649% in 1990 (Arce, 2005: 35). The economic adjustment 
programmes carried out in response to the crisis ultimately generated the worst economic decline in 
Peru’s history. Industrial production decreased with over a third between 1988 and 1990, leading to 
dropping wages, massive unemployment and informalisation of the labour force (Roberts, 1998: 
237-242).  
The heterodox economic policies promoted by García’s government gave rise to increased 
opposition from Peruvian conglomerates and from foreign capital. Particularly, García’s attempt to 
nationalise the banking sector in 1987 put a definite end to any further agreement with the national 
capitalist class. These market forces started to develop various strategies to counteract their 
decreasing institutional influence. One important strategic step was the foundation of a new 
umbrella organisation, the Confederation of Private Business Institutions (CONFIEP). Though 
created in 1984, the attempts to nationalise the banks prompted a collective capitalist 
counteroffensive in alliance with right-wing opposition forces led by novelist Mario Vargas Llosa 
that eventually succeeded in stopping its implementations (Durand, 1998: 266). While the 
neoliberal state project started to crystallise out with the ascendency of these neoliberal forces, 
APRA’s economic mismanagement and the civil war still raging inside Peru seriously undermined 
the position of Peru’s leftist organisations and trade unions. The growing distrust of Peruvians in 
traditional political parties gave way for a political outsider. The newly elected president Alberto 
Fujimori (1990-2000) aimed at the gradual adjustment of economic policies compared to the 
neoliberal shock-therapy as proposed by Vargas Llosa. Once in office, Fujimori travelled to 
Washington where he met with the representatives of the international financial community. The 
message was clear: apply an immediate liberalisation programme and secure the reinsertion of Peru 
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into the international financial community (McClintock and Walls, 2003: 94). Once back in Peru, 
Fujimori started to implement neoliberal policies based on stabilisation and structural adjustment 
programmes with international financial support.  
With reinforced ties to the international financial community, the neoliberal state project 
gained momentum and the policies employed by the Peruvian state became rapidly neoliberal. The 
ascendency of state technocrats contributed to the internationalisation of the Peruvian state as these 
were often aligned with dominant economic ideas originated particularly from the US (see also 
Heigl, 2011; Teichman, 2001). The process of internationalisation of the Peruvian state has also 
generated institutional restructuring. Institutions dealing with international economic affairs such as 
the Ministries of Economy and Finance, Foreign Relations, and Foreign Trade gained influence at 
the cost of institutions dealing with internal affairs, such as the Ministries of Labour and 
Employment Promotion, Production, and Agriculture (Durand, 2003, 2005; see also Cox, 1987; 
Teichman, 2001). Under the so-called Fuji-shock, price controls and almost all government subsidies 
were eliminated, and the service of debt payments – about $60 million a month – were resumed. 
Due to unsatisfactory results, the Fujimori-administration carried out a new reform package by 
decree law that encompassed the total deregulation of markets, privatisation of state-owned 
companies and activities and a tight monetary fiscal policy (Gonzales de Olarte, 1998: 32; 
McClintock and Walls, 2003: 94-95).  
The internalisation of such neoliberal restructuring did not come about without considerable 
struggle. Faced with increased political opposition to his neoliberal agenda, Fujimori dissolved the 
Congress by means of a ‘self-coup’ (autogolpe) on 5 April 1992. Only after external pressure from the 
IMF and the World Bank, which temporarily suspended their loans to Peru, Fujimori installed a 
new Congress in 1993 by popular referendum (Arce, 2005: 43). The autogolpe greatly enhanced 
Fujimori with extraordinary powers to accelerate his neoliberal reforms as well as brutal 
counterinsurgency through presidential laws and decrees. The subsequent massive wave of 
privatisations attracted foreign direct investment in natural resources, consumer markets and the 
financial sector, particularly from the United States (McClintock and Walls, 2003: 99). The 
neoliberal restructuring, privatisations and resulting joint-ventures resulted in an intense 
concentration of ownership and productive capacity that is increasingly transnational in scope, 
thereby diminishing the political leverage of Peruvian nationally-oriented industrial groups and 
small-and-medium enterprises (Durand, 2005: 212-213). 
In less than three years, Fujimori succeeded in restoring political order by resolving Peru’s 
most pressing problems. Sustained economic growth started in the second half of 1992; GDP grew 
to 8.6% annually between 1993 and 1995 and inflation dropped to 48% in 1994 and 11% in 1995 
(Central Reserve Bank of Peru, 2013). Moreover, the capture of Shining Path leader Abimael 
Guzmán in September 1992 meant a decisive defeat for insurgent forces, thereby virtually ending 
more than a decade of bloodshed that had cost approximately 70,000 lives (Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 2003). With these accomplishments, Fujimori secured his re-election in 
1995 with a landslide victory, contributing to confidence and optimism among investors. On the 
other hand, labour and farmer movements experienced a declining political role under the semi-
authoritarian regime. As social movements became increasingly marginalised and exhausted from the 
civil war during the 1980s and 1990s, Fujimori’s neoliberal policies, combined with clientelism and 
populist strategies in order to wipe out all collective social action, further aggravated their situation 
(Bebbington et al., 2008: 11).  
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During the last two years of Fujimori’s regime, his authoritarian character increasingly began 
to threaten economic stability and growth (Arce, 2005: 146). Imports started to outnumber exports 
due to the East-Asian crisis and the El Niño weather phenomenon that damaged Peruvian exports 
(ECLAC, 1998). Criticism on the free-market model arose since Fujimori was only keen on being 
re-elected. As evidence of widespread corruption accumulated, public legitimacy of his tenure 
vanished completely, forcing Fujimori to flee the country (Durand, 2003, 2005; Arce, 2005). After a 
brief spell of political unrest, the election of former World Bank employee Alejandro Toledo (2001-
2006) as new president in 2001 initiated a process of democratisation. Despite the fragile political 
basis of Toledo’s presidency, its orientation remained dependent on the neoliberal hegemony and 
the strength of the primary export economy under the leadership of transnational corporations. His 
policies were centred on macroeconomic stability that formed an impulse for a second generation of 
market reforms (Tanaka, 2005: 29). Key positions in Toledo’s administration were all strongly 
connected to foreign and national capital related to exports or finance, continuing the inherited 
orientation from the preceding regime without major adjustments (Durand, 2003). While 
macroeconomic policies led to an unprecedented economic growth, little would trickle down to the 
poorer regions located in the southern and central highlands and the Amazon (Cameron, 2011: 
379). Although the demise of Fujimori brought greater openness and democracy, it did not lead to 
greater political participation by labour and other social organisations. Whereas the Congress has 
indeed become more receptive for societal demands, the executive has in fact become more closed 
and nearly inaccessible (Bebbington et al., 2008: 13). Consecutive governments have continued to 
block reforms to Fujimori’s labour laws and freely use state power to suppress social and labour 
movements.  
 
 
Labour Exploitation in Peru’s Export-Oriented Regime of Accumulation 
The capitalist restructuring of Peru’s political economy has shaped new economic structures 
and patterns of capital accumulation and surplus extraction. In particular, trade liberalisation became 
one of the major targets of Toledo’s government. The pro-free trade policies were eventually eased 
by the newly created Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism (MINCETUR). Consequently, free 
trade proponents were recruited and the consecutive ministers have all been related to the free 
market discourse. One of its first achievements was the expansion of earlier granted trade preferences 
under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) of 1991 with the launch of the Andean Trade 
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) in 2002. The ATPDEA would expand private 
sector opportunities and investment in the non-traditional sectors of the Andean countries as an 
alternative to the production of coca and help them diversify their economics and expand their 
exports (Wise and Quiliconi, 2010: 30-31). In addition, Peruvian exports enjoyed also preferential 
access under the US Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) that sought to promote economic 
growth of developing countries by stimulating exports.  
Both programmes created an upsurge in Peruvian exports to the United States. Particularly, 
the ATPDEA preferences benefitted the agricultural export and the textile-apparel sectors. 
Agricultural exports to the US under the ATPDEA increased from $209.6 million in 2003 to 
$314.2 million in 2005; simultaneously, Peruvian textile exports expanded from $469.2 million in 
2003 to $821.2 million in 2005 (Alayza, 2007: 145). In addition, it is estimated that 106,000 direct 
and indirect jobs depend on the export of textile and apparel, whereas the ten most exported 
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agricultural products alone generated 350,000 jobs in 2005. In total, approximately 744,000 
Peruvians have jobs directly or indirectly depending on exports that enter the US duty-free under the 
ATPDEA (MINCETUR, 2005a: 11-15; MINCETUR, 2005b: 5-6). Consequently, national 
entrepreneurs and state technocrats portrayed the possible losses in case of expiration of the 
ATPDEA and, to a lesser extent, GSP schemes as a ‘scary scenario’ (MINCETUR, 2005a) and 
started to push for a bilateral free trade agreement that would make the preferences permanent. At 
the same time, agricultural sectors dedicated to subsistence and production for the internal market, 
characterised by labour-intensive and pre-modern production structures in the rural areas, would 
face a decline in production and employment levels with the TPA. According to MINCETUR 
(2005c: 9-11), the TPA would generate a more ‘efficient allocation’ of workers between productive 
sectors, displacing them from traditional agricultural sectors such as wheat, rice, cereals and grains, 
to non-traditional sectors such as vegetables, fruits and nuts, which are characterised by modern, 
capital-intensive and highly competitive export-oriented sectors located in Peru’s coastal areas.  
As such, the dynamics of the TPA stood to reinforce the juxtaposition of the two existing 
and competing agricultural models that have come to reflect Peru’s deeper and historical cleavages. 
The commercial benefits under the new export-oriented regime of accumulation have indeed been 
highly unequally distributed. Only 3% of Peru’s cultivable lands is dedicated to agricultural exports, 
which represents a mere 9% of the GDP for the agricultural sector (CEPES/CONVEAGRO, 2006: 
21). However, more than 90% of the direct impact of increased agricultural exports under the 
ATPDEA has been concentrated in the Lima-area and along the coastal strip. Simultaneously, with 
the TPA in force, half of the sensitive products would receive immediate tariff reduction, which 
would affect more than one million producers and their families that are located in the rural and 
poorest zones in Peru (Alayza, 2007: 146, 161).  
The expansion of the neoliberal export-oriented model has led to major macroeconomic 
growth after the fall of Fujimori. GDP rates increased from 5% in 2002 to 9.8% in 2008 before a 
sharp plunge to 0.9% in 2009 in the wake of the global crisis (Central Reserve Bank of Peru, 2013). 
Also formal urban employment rates have been growing during the same period from negative in 
2002 to 8.3% in 2008 before declining to 1.4% in 2009 (Gamero Requena, 2010: 18). However, 
macroeconomic prosperity has not been translated into improved conditions for Peruvian workers. 
The adoption of competitive policies brought about a wide range of legal reforms in order to 
restructure labour relations in line with the orientation of the neoliberal state project. During the 
period when most of the country’s new jobs were created, labour market conditions actually 
deteriorated. Labour in export-oriented production sectors is characterised by low wages, 
considerable job insecurity, overtime and low levels of unionisation.  
In absence of a unified labour code, labour laws and regulations are scattered among 
approximately 50 different bodies of Peruvian laws. Peru’s most relevant labour law is codified in the 
Productivity and Competitiveness Law (No.728), adopted by Fujimori in 1997, which legalises 
dismissals without justification, allows flexibility, and permits collective dismissals, often used to fire 
pro-union workers (Solidary Center, 2009: 7, 13). Moreover, labour relations in Peru’s most 
competitive sectors have been governed by a separate regime of labour laws. In particular, the Decree 
on the Promotion of Non-Traditional Exports (No. 22342) allows employers to hire workers on a 
series of short-term contracts that can be renewed without requiring hiring the worker permanently, 
severely affecting the workers’ ability to organise unions. Evidently, unionisation rates in the textile 
and agricultural industry sectors are low and workers remain reluctant to form a union or join an 
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existing one in fear of repercussions of the employer (SOMO, 2011a; 2011b). In addition, the law 
on the Promotion of Agriculture (No. 27360) of 2000, applying only to agricultural sectors, replaced 
the eight-hour day standard with an ‘accumulated workday’ formula, while the minimum wage in 
the agricultural sector includes accrued benefits and bonuses in comparison to non-agricultural 
workers (Solidarity Center, 2009: 18-19). As a result, the vast majority of agricultural workers lack a 
formal contract and health insurance, unionisation rates are below national average and working 
hours are longer (Gamero Requena, 2010: 28-30). Although intended as a special and transient 
labour regime to stimulate investments in agriculture in the 1990s, this particular law was extended 
until 2012 by Congress in 2006 (RedGE, 2012).  
The transformation of the Peruvian state and the concomitant internationalisation processes 
have had severe repercussions for the institutional capacities to enforce labour standards according to 
the core principles of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). At the time of the negotiations, 
Peru’s Ministry of Labour and Employment Promotion received less than 1% of the national budget 
and lacks sufficient resources to inspect compliance with fundamental labour rights (ADL, 2007: 
12). Although numerous international labour rights conventions have been ratified and 
implemented into national legislation, estimates suggest that Peru violates more than half of them 
(Mujica Petit, 2009: 38, 104). These violations culminate in the export-oriented sectors of the 
Peruvian economy, whereas the labour situation in export-processing-zones (EPZs) tends to be worse 
(ADL, 2007: 27; Solidary Center, 2009: 6). Consequently, union movements and employment 
stability have been seriously weakened. Despite government promises to implement programmes of 
‘decent work’ as outlined by the ILO, breaches of fundamental labour rights are the order of the day.  
 
 
Strategic Selectivities and Coercion Under the García Administration 
The presidential elections of 2006 provided a window of opportunity for counter-hegemonic 
forces in Peruvian society. The growing social dissent with the pro-market policies and the lack of 
adequate political linkages created the conditions for new leftists movements as had been occurring 
in Peru’s Andean counterparts, culminating in massive support for the nationalist and former 
military leader Ollanta Humala. Although Humala won the first round of the presidential elections, 
APRA’s constituency in the coastal and urban areas as well as the support by the neoliberal 
hegemonic forces resulted in a win for former anti-imperialist and state interventionist Alan García. 
The vested interests in consolidating the economic model based on exports and free trade became 
well-embedded in his surprisingly changed discourse. Despite a electoral campaign based on an 
eloquent critique of the neoliberal model, García increasingly relied on centre-right forces in 
Congress as well as neoliberal technocrats in pursuing orthodox macroeconomic policies once in 
office (Cameron, 2011: 388-389). Although producing annual growth rates between 7% and 9% in 
the first three years of APRA rule, his government, at the same time, failed to make social 
investments that would bring economic resources generated by the commodity-led growth to the 
impoverished regions of the country. García’s rapid embracement of the TPA constitutes the lock in 
of the neoliberal orientation, exacerbating the fractures in Peru’s social structures. The hegemony of 
the export-oriented economic model has become more contested and Peruvian state leaders 
increasingly rely on the frequent use of coercive methods to secure continued and expansive 
processes of surplus extraction and capital accumulation. 
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The neoliberal strategic selectivity appears in the way in which the state addresses particular 
interests or strategies among neoliberal forces. In particular, the strategic selectivity of the 
institutional terrain allowed neoliberal forces to warrant favourable conditions for an optimal 
accumulation of capital. This capacity has become manifest through a series of legislative decrees 
with dubious constitutional validity, that were deemed necessary to implement the TPA but, instead, 
entail a much broader regulatory modification of Peruvian legislature aimed to facilitate access to 
natural resources, private investment and infrastructure (Eguiruren Praeli, 2008: 14-20). 
Particularly, environmental groups and Amazonian indigenous groups have been mobilised by the 
decrees that seek access and commodification of collectively held lands in order to expand oil 
production and private investment. The APRA administration has faced increasing strike activities, 
including teachers protesting against educational reforms and miners objecting to the use of casual 
labour (Cameron, 2011: 392). Faced with the prospects of social protests transforming into political 
movements, the government has resorted to the condemnation and even criminalisation of protests 
that blocked the government’s priorities (Bebbington et al., 2008: 14). This attitude has been 
promoted by president García himself in a series of articles in Peru’s main newspaper El Comercio 
(García Pérez, 2007), in which he accuses opposition to his administration’s ideas and policies as 
‘dissenters’ who hinder Peru’s modernisation, consigning them to the status of the ‘dog in the 
manger’.  
With regard to labour, various legislative decrees directly reverse some of the TPA 
agreements. Decree 1057 reduces benefits for public sector worked hired under administrative 
service contracts, whereas decree 1025 obliges public workers to undergo frequent performance 
evaluations, imposing a punitive logic to fire workers who do not pass such state assessments 
(Solidarity Center, 2009: 7; Mujica Petit, 2009: 62). Moreover, decree 1086 to Promote 
Competitiveness, Formalisation and Development of the Micro- and Small Enterprise and Access to 
Decent Employment substantially weakens the terms and conditions for workers in micro- and small 
enterprises as workplaces of 100 or fewer workers (previously 50) enjoy less vacation, lower pay, and 
even less compensation if unjustly dismissed (Solidarity Center, 2009: 7). Considering the high 
representation of micro- and small enterprises in the Peruvian economy, decree 1086 is argued to 
cover more than 80% of all workers, thereby affecting fundamental labour rights for a vast collective 
of workers (Mujica Petit, 2009: 71-73; RedGE, 2010). Moreover, decree 1038 reduces the scope of 
Peruvian law that puts a hold on abusive practices of subcontracting or tertiarisation, which has been 
one of the most invoked mechanisms to circumvent labour rights and to impede unionisation, 
particularly in the export-oriented agriculture, mining and hydrocarbons sector (Mujica Petit, 2009: 
78-79; Bebbington, 2010: 20).  
Meanwhile, parliamentary debates over a General Labour Law that would grant workers with 
greater protection against unfair dismissals and restore the right to collective bargaining per industry, 
have been paralysed since 2002 (ADL, 2007: 22. The deadlock in talks over such initiatives reflects 
fierce resistance from the dominant state institutions and corporate power groups. When USTR 
finally gave the green light for the coming into effect of the TPA on the last day in office, 16 January 
2009, Peru was still failing to comply with the new labour standards as well as several other 
legislative modifications (Gamero Requeno, 2010). The forthcoming entrance of the newly elected 
Barack Obama to the White House on 20 January 2009 might have rushed the implementation 
process and its eventual approval. Meanwhile, it has become clear that the hopes and predictions of 
TPA proponents have failed to materialise. Labour conditions in Peru have deteriorated rapidly since 
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the coming into force of the trade deal. Potential benefits were almost immediately nullified with the 
waking global financial and economic crisis; concomitantly, the sharp plunge in employment rates in 
2009 revealed the structural vulnerability of workers operating in the export-oriented sectors.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This article has examined the labour dimension of the US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement 
and its broader ramifications for labour relations in Peru’s new regime of accumulation. Despite the 
inclusion of a labour chapter in the trade agreement that forces both parties to abide by international 
conventions on fundamental labour rights, much of its actual enforcement has come to rely on the 
institutional capacities of the Peruvian state and its engagement with labour and human rights 
protection. The central argument is that the political processes that have influenced the course of 
events leading to the TPA have to be understood against the backdrop of the wider transformation 
of the balance of social forces, which has come to reflect the material and institutional dominance of 
the neoliberal sectors of the Peruvian society. The profound restructuring of Peru’s social relations 
has given rise to a neoliberal project that is oriented towards the opening of new fields for capital 
accumulation through the commitment to massive deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation 
programmes. This has culminated into a new regime of accumulation that is based on a highly 
profitable export-oriented growth model, which, at the same time, is characterised by severe forms of 
labour exploitation. The extraordinary expansion of exports has mobilised privileged lobbies in 
favour of the TPA that would gain disproportionately from further trade liberalisation while losses 
for the population at large would be more probable. These patterns of surplus extraction have 
ultimately become ‘locked in’ by the disciplinary nature of the TPA.  
The structural weakness of organised labour and social movements has been further 
aggravated by the ascendency of the neoliberal state. Whereas neoliberal forces enjoy privileged 
access, the neoliberal strategic selectivity has limited the institutional openings for the political 
articulation by trade unions and social organisations. In fact, with state power increasingly 
concentrated in the executive branches under the García-administration, political dissent has become 
increasingly delegitimised, marginalised and criminalised. As such, the Peruvian state has come to 
rely on coercive methods to sustain profitable modes of surplus extraction and offensively attacks 
opposition movements that are not in line with it. Although new hopes for change arose with the 
election of Ollanta Humala in 2011, the export-oriented policies remain to fracture Peru’s deeply 
rooted historical and geographical cleavages. With social conflicts continuing to increase, reflecting 
the underlying class struggles, the search for greater profits has been accompanied by greater rates of 
exploitation and increased pressure on the workforce. The repressive management of labour relations 
and natural resources in favour of transnationally-oriented sectors constitutes a key mechanism in 
securing an ongoing process of surplus extraction and the transfer of value from the periphery to the 
North. The efforts by the Peruvian government to vilify workers and local communities have indeed 
contributed to a stable investment environment sustaining economic growth, albeit, one that takes 
place in a permanent state of emergency.  
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